Rodríguez Iglesias, IsabelBárcena‐Ruiz, Juan CarlosCasado‐Izaga, F.JavierHamoudi, Hamid2024-03-112024-03-112014-05-31Bárcena‐Ruiz, J. C., Casado‐Izaga, F. J., Hamoudi, H., & Rodriguez, I. (2016). Optimal zoning in the unconstrained H otelling game. Papers in Regional Science, 95(2), 427-435.1056-8190https://hdl.handle.net/10115/30867This paper studies a zoning mechanism that gives the optimal locations of two firms in a linear city under mill prices. A regulator biased towards consumers allows a central area of the city to be shared by firms and consumers and thus firms are not allowed to locate outside the city limits. A regulator more concerned about firms extends this central zone outside the city limits and the city has a residential use only if the firms so decide. Finally, a regulator highly biased towards firms allows them to locate only beyond a set distance from the city, so there is a strip of land outside the city but close to its boundaries, for alternative uses.engAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacionalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/Zoningregulationfirms' locationsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article10.1111/pirs.12132info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess