Hamoudi, HamidRodríguez Iglesias, IsabelSanz Martín-Bustamante, Marcos2024-03-112024-03-112017-01Hamoudi, H., Rodríguez Iglesias, I., & Martín-Bustamante, M. (2017). Optimal Zoning in Spatial Differentiation. Estudios de economía, 44(1).https://hdl.handle.net/10115/30865This study analyzes optimal zoning policy in a duopolistic spatial competition framework for both circular and linear spaces. A regulator is introduced in the third stage of the price-location game through a welfare function to model zoning preferences from firms and consumers. An equilibrium outcome is then found for both spatial configurations. When the regulator is inclined to favor consumers (consumer-oriented) both firms are restricted to locate at one point to serve the whole market. Nevertheless, when the preferences of the regulator are biased towards firms (firm-oriented) the zoning area is maximized, with both firms being located at the market boundaries. The equilibrium outcome confirms location patterns found in real life situations under a non-neutral regulator.engAttribution-NonCommercial 4.0 Internacionalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/Zoningspatial competitionwelfare functionequilibrium resultsindustrial policyinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article10.4067/S0718-52862017000100033info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess