Optimal zoning in the unconstrained Hotelling game
DOI:
10.1111/pirs.12132
Date:
2014-05-31
Abstract
This paper studies a zoning mechanism that gives the optimal locations of two firms in a linear city under mill prices. A regulator biased towards consumers allows a central area of the city to be shared by firms and consumers and thus firms are not allowed to locate outside the city limits. A regulator more concerned about firms extends this central zone outside the city limits and the city has a residential use only if the firms so decide. Finally, a regulator highly biased towards firms allows them to locate only beyond a set distance from the city, so there is a strip of land outside the city but close to its boundaries, for alternative uses.
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